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In recentyears, there hasbeen a renewedconcern in the design
and administration of export promotion policies.Worldwide, this
interest hasbeenstimulated by the success storiesof the EastAsian
dragons; successthat has been largely attributed to their export
performance. At the same time, the works of Bhagwati (1978),
Krueger (1978), Michaely (1977), and Balassa (1978), amongothers,
documented with cross-countrydata the positive link between eco=
nomic growth and exports. In the Philippines,a recurringbalanceof
payments problem has highlighted the need to nurture exports.
Furthermore, the import substitutingstrategy pursuedin the 1950s
and 1960s and the concomitant trade regimethat hasbeen carried
over into the 1970s and early 1980s are perceived by many as
exhibiting an overwhelming biasagainstexports (Power and Sicat
1971; Tan 1979; Medalla 1986).
In this context, export promotion becomes imperative not
only becauseexports are by themselves desirable owing to the
foreign exchange they bring and their favorable growth implica-
tions but alsobecauseof the need to counteractthe antiexport bias
of the prevailing trade regime and, thus, to create a more neutral
incentive environment, in principle, export promotion implies the
use of instruments that (1) compensatefor the implicit penalties
againstexports in the macroeconomicsmilieu, and (2) provide incen-
tives to the exporting activity over and above those which would
prevail in a neutral strategy. However, it should be stressedthat the
emphasisof this paper will be on the identification of instruments
that will neutralize the penalty on exports inherent in the present
macroeconomicsenvironment rather than on the provisionof sub=
sidlesto exportsper se.
The purposeof this paper is to reviewand anal'/ze fiscal incen-
rivesfor exports in the Philippines.Specifically, this study will focus
on the assessment of the incentivesprovided under the(,e'_ of the
Board of Investments (BOI) and the Export Proc'essi_gZone
* Research Fellow, Philippine Institute for Development Studies.200 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
Authority (EPZA) and the tax and duty exemption/drawback
schemesadministeredby the Bureauof Customs(BOC) and the BOl.
The next section presents ananalytical framework for the
designof a rational incentive packagefor exports, The nontechnical
reader may skip it but should take note that it derivesthe desirable
characteristicsof anexport policy that will mitigate, if not eliminate,
the bias against exports arising from the existing protection
structure. The first-best solution consistsof zero tarif_f_on imports
and a realisticexchangerate policy. In a second-bestscenario,in the
period when the first-bestsolution isnot yet forthcoming becauseof
political and other considerationsor in the interim period before a
first solution is actually put in place, the appropriate set of policies
include: (1) providing exporters accessto intermediate and capital
inputs at free trade prices; (2) ensuring that exporters are subject
to a free tradeexchangerate,or, alternatively, that they arecompen-
sated for the penalty to them that results from an overvalued
exchangerate; and (3) possibly providing exporters with the same
amount of net effective protection accorded to producers in the
import substitutingactivity.
Section3 describesandevaluatesthe existingfiscal incentivesto
exports against the backdrop outlined in the preceding section.
Finally, the lastsectionsummarizesthe findingsof the study.
2.0 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
The rationale for the provision of export incentives is better
understood by taking a closer look at the bias againstthe export
activity relative to the import substituting activity _h_.qe-_ by
the prevailingprotection structure. The biasagainstex_p-0--_E/], may
be defined as the proportional difference in the domestic value
added in import substitution and the domestic value added from
exporting (Balassa1971). Alternatively, B may be viewed as the
proportional difference in the levelof effective protection accorded
to the import substitution activity and the exporting activity. Thus,
is
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or
(1 +Ep i,)v/"
Bj = - 1 (3)
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wherevdj isdomesticvalueaddedin industryj,
vi isfree trade valueaddedin industryj,
is the implicit tariff rate on the output of industry./_
7_ is the implicit tariff rateon intermediateinput i,
a;j is the amount of intermediate input i usedto produceone
unit of output/,
EPR/ isthe effective protection rate of industryj,
is refersto the import substitutingactivity, and
x refersto the export activity.1
B may be measureddirectly for aggregate(or sectoral) export-
ables and importables by taking into account prevailingtariffs and
quantitative restrictionson imports as well asall subsidiesactually
granted to exports (including BOI/EPZA incentivesand duty exemp-
tion/drawback on imported inputs into exports). The presentpaper,
however,follows another track. It simply usesequation (2) asa start-
ing block in the formulation of criteria againstwhich the existing
incentive system for exports may be assessed. Thus, for analytical
purposes,equation (2) is initially viewed from the perspectiveof a
situation where there are tariffs and nontariff measureson import-
ables but where taxes and subsidieson exports are assumedto be
zero. Next, the set of conditions that will reduce, if not eliminate,
the biasagainstexports that resultsfrom the protection structureis
derived. These conditions are_then usedasguidepostsin the actual
appraisal of the prevailing export incentive schemesin Section 3.
In a situation where there areno subsidies on exportsand where
the implicit tariff rates on importables are not all equalto zero, B is
1. The implicit tariff is the ratio of domestic price to border price of any given
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positive.2 This measurelrepresents the penalty on exports relativeto
import substitution that the protection structure perpetuates.This
antiexport bias can be eliminated by reducing the expression in
equation (2) to zero. The first-bestand most direct way of achieving
this is by the outright removal of tariffs and restrictions on all
imports. Doing this reducesboth the numerator and denominator
of the first term in (2) tothe free trade valueadded, vi. It alsoimplies
that the effective protection rate, EPR, iszero for allj's. Consequent-
ly, B becomesequal to zero. However, both economic (adjustment
costs, timing/sequencing issues,etc.) and noneconomic (political,
etc.) considerationsmay indicate that the first-best approach may
not be feasible in the short run or even in the medium term. The
second-bestsolution would then compensate for the bias against
exports via a combination of a subsidyon output and an exemption/
drawback on taxes on inputs used in the production for exports.
• The appropriate combination of instrumentsin this second-best
scenariosuggestsitself, if, from equation (2), we were to ask: what
adjustmentsmust beintroduced in the denominator of the first term,
i.e., the domestic value added in the exporting activity, to make it
equal to the numerator of the first term, i.e., the domestic value
added in the import substituting activity, so as to remove the bias
againstexports?And the answer is: simultaneously reduce all 7_sin
the exporting activity to zero and augment the resulting value
added by an amount equal to (EPRis) vj. In other words, the bias
against exports arising from the protection structure may be
counteracted by (1) givingexport producersaccessto inputs (inter-
mediate and capital) at world market prices,(2) ensuringthat export-
ers are subject to a free trade exchange rate, and (3) providing
exporters with the sameamount of net effective protection accorded
to producersin the import substituting industry.
Setting all _.'s on intermediate inputs to the export activity to
zero would reduceequation (2) into:
(I+T is ) - % ai (l+Ti) ]
Bj = i -- 1 (4)
1 - _; a,.
i
2, Medalla (1990) estimated the average tariff on importables to be 30 percent
and the implicit tariff on exportables to be negative 2 percent in the second half of the
1980s, The resulting EPRs are 75 percent for the former and -4 percent for the latter.MANASAN: FISCAL INCENTIVES FOR EXPORTS 203
(1 + EPR/s) vi_.
aj= J - 1 (5)
vfs
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Thus, by making intermediate inputsusedin export production
tariff free, adjustment.(1) puts exporters on an equal footing with
their foreign competitors in terms of costs of inputs. It equates
domestic value added in exports to its free trade value added and
reducesthe EPR in the export activity to zero•This adjustmentmay
be broken down into the following: (la) the elimination of nontariff
restrictionson the importation of inputs to export production, (lb)
tax and duty free importation of intermediate inputs and capital
equipment used in export production, (lc) the givingto exporters
of a rebateequalto the implicit tariff timesthe border price of local-
ly-sourcedimportable inputs, and (ld)the grantingto exportersof a
rebate equal to the implicit tariff timesthe border price of the im-
portable goods content of nontraded and domestically-procured
intermediate inputs. Adjustments (lc) and (ld) areessentialbecause
tariff and nontariff measuresdrive awedgebetweenthe border price
and domestic price such that the domestic price of the importable
input, regardlessof whether it is actually imported or purchased
locally, increases by an amount equal to the implicit tariff, 7-.These
adjustments are necessaryto avoid the discrimination againstthe
use of domestically-produced,importable intermediate and capital
inputs in export production that will ariseif only adjustments (la)
and (lb) are put in place. They would, thus, encourageefficient
backward linkagesin the export activity. At the firm level,adjust-
ment (ld) may be givento final exporters in the hope that its bene-
fits will be passedon to the indirectexporters or that it may be made
ledirectly to indirect exporters.
uation (5) suggests that even after exporters havebeengiven
accessto inputs at undistorted prices,somebiasagainstthem would
still remain'relativeto tl_'eirworld competitors aswell as relativeto
domestic producers of import substitutes.Specifically, the remain-
ing penalty on exports is equal to the product of the effective pro-
tection rate in import substitution and the free trade valueadded in /s
the export activity, i e, EPR! x_• Recall, however, that the ef- • ' , ! !
fectwe protection rate may be expressedas:
(1 + EPR/) (6)
(1 + NEPRj) = (r* / r)204 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
where NEPR isthe net effective protection rate in industry/,
*r is the shadow exchange rate, i.e., the exchangerate that
will obtain under a free trade regime,and
r isthe official exchangerate.
This implies that the remaining correction may be subdivided
into two parts: (a) grantingexporters an incentivewhosebenefit is
equal to the proportional difference between the shadowexchange
rate and the official exchangerate times the free trade value added
in the exporting activity, i.e., [(r*/r) - 1] VT, or what we call adjust-
ment (2), and (b) givingexportersan incentivewhosebenefit isequal
to the net effective protection rate of the import substitutingacti-
vity, times the free trade value added in the export activity, v_
i.e., NEPRT, or what we referto asadjustment (3).
Thus, introducing adjustment (1) and adjustment (2) in equa-
tion (2) yieldsthe following:
(1 + EPRjs ) vi.s / - 1 (7)
Bj = v7 + v.x_(r*/r - 1)
Substituting equation (6) in equation (7), we obtain:
(r*/r) (1 + NEPR7 } vis
Bj = J - 1
(r*./r) v.x !
ors
(1 + NEPR _? ) v/?
Bi = / J - 1 (8)
vf
J
Once it is recognized that the protection system makes it
possibleto maintain a balance of payments equilibrium at a lower
exchangerate than that which will prevailunder a free trade regime,
it becomesapparent that making exporters truly competitive in the
international market would not be enough to provide them with
inputs at free trade prices. It is alsonecessaryto compensatethem
for the undervaluation of the foreign currency that is engendered
by the tariff system. This would require that the net effective pro-
tection rate of exports be made to equal zero by givingexporters206 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
following:_(-li locating in an export processing zone (EPZ), (2)
usin_donded manufacturing warehouse (BMW) facilities, and (3)
importing under Customs Administrative Order 3-78 (CAO 3-78).
On the other hand, tax and duty drawback on imported intermediate
inputs used in export production may be obtained under the follow-
ing modes: ($) individual drawback scheme of the Bureau of Cus-
toms (BOC), and,(2) fixed drawback schemeof the BOI.
EPZ enterprises are exempt from tariffs, taxes and other restric-
tions that might otherwise be imposed on t_il" imports. In terms of
value of exports, EPZ enterprises rankedA(_condamongst firms that
availed themselves of the various exemption/drawback systems
(WB 1987). To import intermedi_q_e-andcapital inputs, EPZ enter-
prises are asked to follow a ,f_Ye-stepprocess requiring only three
documents (Table 1), while other exporters wishing to import under
consignment need to submit a total of 23 documents (Table 2).
Also, the non-CIF cost of imports of EPZ firms is low. The process-
ing fee charged by EPZA on each shipment is no more than @"200
(DTI, 1988).
Likewise, the bonded manufacturing warehouse system allows
exporters to import inputs free of tax and duty. It also facilitates
the release of imported raw materials from the BOC. There are at
least fifteen documentary requirements for the establishment of a
BMW. Foremost amongst thes_"are: (1) BOI registration; (2) the
firm's commitment to export at least 70 percent of its output;
(3) annual FOB saleswhich should be at leastequal to US$1 million;
(4) "formula of manufacture ''3 ; and (5) copy of feasibility study of
BMW operations. There are also specific requirements to be met
regarding the physical condition of the BMW (Table 2). The opera-.
tion of a BMW entails the payment of certain fees: (1) a fixed annual
supervision fee of f45,000; (2) a performance bond oft_200,000 to
guarantee compliance with the laws and regulations affecting BMWs;
and (3) a reexport bond equivalent to the amount of duties, taxes
and other charges that would have been due otherwise. Finally, all
imports of BMWs are required to be covered by a BOI certificate
of nonavailability of local substitute.
While accessto BMWs tends to be effectively limited to large
firms producing primarily for the export market, small, medium
and indirect exporters may import raw materials tax and duty free
by making use of the facilities of common customs bonded ware-
houses (CCBWs) operated by the Philippine International Trading
3. The "formula of manufacture" consists of physical input coefficients endorsed
by the National Institute of Science and Technology (NIST) and differentiating between
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Table 1
DOCUMENTATION AND PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS
FOR IMPORTS OF EPZ FIRMS
The following are the documentation and procedural requirements for the
importation of goods for EPZA enterprises:
1. Application for an Import Permit (IP) shall be filed with the Enterprise
Assistance (Import-Export) Division of the Enterprise Operations Depart-
ment, EPZA, in Manila, or with the Enterprise Service Division in the
zones. The application is made on EPZA Form No. 8101 (IP) accomplished




2. Upon approval, copies of the permit shall be distributed asfollows:
a) Original and yellow copies to the importer;
b) Green copy to the BOC, Manila; and
c) Blue copy, one each to the EPZA Police and the Manila International
Container Port (MICP),
3. The examiner or the Enterprise Service Officer I (ESO I) will assessthe
amount of processing fee to be paid by the importer and issuea payment
slip to the cashier.
4. The importer pays the processingfee to the cashier of the Financial Depart-
ment, and presents the official receipt (OR) to the Import-Export Division.
5. The importer submits to the Import-Export Division of EPZA a photocopy
of the L/C or other documents ev denc ng the mode of payment, together
with the sales contract. Failure to submit the required documents within
thirty (30) days from the approval of the permit shall be a ground for can-
cellation of the permit by EPZA, unless extended on reasonable grounds.
Corporation (PITC), Philippine Exporters Foundation (Philexport),
Mindanao Textile Corporation (Mintex), Philippine Integrated
(Manufacturers) Exporters, Inc. (PIE), Red Flower Garments, Inc.,
and Royal Undergarments Corporation (RUC), and others. BMWs
and CCBWs account for the biggest chunk of exports (in terms of
export value) with accessto duty free imports (WB 1987).
Entitles that operate CCBWs essentially serve as import agents
of small exports for a service fee that rangesfrom 1 to 4 percent of
the CI F value of imports. The exporters are generally required to be208 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
Table 2
DOCUMENTARY AND OTHER REQUIREMENTS FOR
ESTABLISHMENT OF BMWs
Without Subcontracting
1. Instruments evidencing absolute ownership or lease contract covering
the proposedwarehouse;
2. Plant location showing means of accessto the property;
3. Plant layout showing and describing the size and construction of the
proposed warehouse, together with the intended use of each room,
section or compartment, aswell asthe surrounding premises;
4. Flow chart showing the nature of the work of manufacture/processing;
5. Certified true copy of Registration Certificate with the SEC, together
with the Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws of Co-Partnership,
as the casemay be;
6. Certified true copy of Registration Certificate with the BTRCP and
BIR;
7. List of machinery and equipment;
8. Certified true copy of Certificate of Registration with the BOI;
9. BOI endorsement of the application (for garments, GTEB issuesthe
licenseto operate a BMW);
10. Copy of Inspection Permit from the Electrical Department;
11, List of articles to be manufactured;
12. List of all raw materials to be imported;
13. Formula of manufacture, patterns or sketches of articles to be ex-
ported;
14. Building (mayor's) permit; and
15. Copy of project feasibility study of BMW operation.
With Subcontracting
1. Name of subcontractor;
2. Copy of coritract with the subcontractor;
3. Certificate of accreditation of the subcontractor, if already accredited
by BOC; if the subcontractor selected has not as yet been accredited,
a letter of application of the subcontractor, together with other docu-
ments required for the application;
4. Flow chart showing the specific processing stage to be subcontracted;
and
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Table2 (continued)
Physical Conditions
1. Plant location - The proposed BMW shall be located in an accessible
place to ensure easy inspection by customs officials.
2. Compartments for materials/articles
a) Every BMW shall have permanent compartments separated,from
the premises to be used exclusively for the storageand safekeeping
of all imported materials, finished articles ready for export, and by
products/wastages;
b) The compartment shall be properly secured to prevent any un-
authorized personfrom having accessthereto;
c) Such compartments shall each have two locks: the key of one lock
shall be kept by the customs bonded warehouse officer at all
times and the key to the other lock shall be kept by the operator;
d) The contents therein shall be properly arranged for the conve-
nience of the authorized customs official making the required
examination, inspection or inventory.
3. Office space for customs personnel. - Accessible and adequate Office
space shall be provided for the customs personnel to be assignedat the
BMW.
Fees
1. Supervision fee equal to P45_00 per annum.
2. Performance bond in the amount of P200,000 to guarantee compliance
with laws and regulations affecting BMWs.
3. Re-export bond equivalent to the amount of duties, taxes and other
chargesthat would otherwise be due.
L
Source: DTI (1988)
registered with either the BOI or NACIDA or to be accredited by
the BOI, NACIDA, BOC, GTEB, etc. The documentary require-
ments for accreditation in a CCBW varies from 5 to 17 (Table 3).
They also have to comply with the "formula of manufacture," the
BOI certification of nonavailability of local substitute,and the post-
ing of the reexport bond requirements.
CAO 3-78 exempts small- and medium-scaleexporters from the
payment of duties and taxes on raw materials imported on consign-
ment basis.To be eligible for this privilege,exportershaveto satisfy210 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
Table 3
SAMPLE ACCREDITATION REQUIREMENTS FOR CCBW
A. Philexport
In order to be accredited with Philexport, the exporter must submit a dulY
accomplished application form together with:
1. Bank certification of export performance;
2. Copy of businesspapers;
3. Formula of manufacture;
4. General serviceagreement; and
5. Accreditation fee.
B. Red Flower Garments
1. Duly accomplished GTEB-BMW Form No. 11-A (to be notarized);
2. Copy of Articles of Incorporation/Articles of Partnership;
3. Copy of Mayor's Permit;
4. Copy of Income Tax Return (ITR);
5. Copy of Audited Financial Statements (AFS) of Interim Balance
Sheet (if operating for lessthan a year);
6. Sketch of location of plant and factory;
7, Plant layout;
8. List of authorized representatives (including brokers) and their posi-
tion/s, specimen signature/s;
9, Certificate of registration with BOI;
10. Certificate of registration with BTRCP/SEC;
11. List of machineries (brand, model, type, serial no.);
12. Certificate of ownership of machineries;
13. Contract of lease/title over plant premises;
14. List of names of office personnel/workers;
15. Latest payroll sheet;
16. Purchase order/sales contract;
17. List of materials to be imported;
18. Company profile (to be notarized); and
19. Certification if one of these requirements has not been prepared).
the following: (1) their total assetsmust be between 1J500,000 and
1'5 million; and (2) they must not be registeredwith the BOI as an
export producer, nor should they haveaccess to drawback and ware-
housing schemesof the Tariff and CustomsCode of the Philippines
(TCCP) or to the incentivesunder the Embroidery Law or the EPZA
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3-78 have to submit some20 documentary requirements in support
of an application for duty exemption (Tables4 and 5). In particular,
the Certificate of Qualification requires the signatureof the Com-
missionerof the Bureau of Customshimself. Like the BMW scheme,
CAO3-78 calls for the submissionof a formula of manufacture and
the posting of a reexport bond that is one and a half times that
requiredunder the BMW scheme.
Direct and indirect exporters may obtain drawbacks of taxes
and duties paid on intermediate inputs either from the BOC or the
BOI. The requirementsfor drawback claimsunder the BOI scheme
are presented in Table 6. As with the other schemes,compliance
with the "formula of manufacture" requirement and the BOI certi-
fication of nonavailability of local substitutes is prescribed. Tax
credit under this system is available from 7 to 30 days upon
submissionof the necessarydocuments. It should be pointed out
that the law providesthat, at most, 99 percent of the duties and
taxespaid on imported materialsmaybe refunded.
While the refunds under the individual drawback scheme of
the BOC are basedon actual usageof imported inputs, tax credits
under the fixed drawback scheme administered by the BOI are
based on predetermined rates. The requirements and procedures
to be followed for firms to benefit from the fixed drawbacksystem
are relatively simple (seeTable 7). However, while this schemeis
availableto both BOI and non-BOI registeredexport producers,the
number of export items covered is rather limited (e.g., only 225
itemsin 1987) (WB, 1987).
Finally, under the value added tax (VAT) system=that is
currently in place, exports are zero-rated.This impliesthat a VAT-
registeredenterprise will not be taxed on its exported output but
could claim a tax credit for value added tax paid on imported and
locally-sourcedraw materials used in export manufacture. The tax
refund is due within 60 days from the date of filing of claim, which
is20 daysfollowing the end of eachquarter.
3.1.2 Assessment
Unrestricted Choice Between Local and Imported Inputs
The framework outlined in Section2 suggests that an important
component of providing free trade statusto exports isthe absence
of restrictions on imports of intermediate inputs to export produc-
tion. This implies that exporters are given unrestricted choice
between imported and locally-produced inputs. Contrary to this
precept, all exporters except those located in an EPZ are required212 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
Table 4
DOCUMENTARY REQUIREMENTS IN APPLICATION
FOR DUTY EXEMPTION UNDER CAO 3-78
1. CB IMPORT AUTHORITY (IA)
Requirements for issuance of IA:
1.1 Copy of the Certificate of Registration with the concerned government
agency, such as the BOI, GTEB, PITC, or CB; in the absence thereof,
a Certificate of Qualification from the BOC;
1,2 Copy of the processing agreement between consignee and foreign
principal or supplier, or the confirmed purchase order or export L/C;
1.3 For regulated items, commodity clearance from the appropriate govern-
ment agency;
1,4 Proforma Invoice; and
1.5 Mark-up Computation Report approved by the CB Export Department
(this requirement can be waived for the first shipment).
Requirements for MCR
1.5.1 Copy of Processing Aggreement of Confirmed Purchase Order
(PO);
1.5.2 Copy of Certificate of Registration as export producer with
the BOI, CB, GTEB, EPZA or other government agencies (for
new applications); or
Copy of Certificate of Qualification (if not registered with any
government agency);
1,5.3 If the product's quantity and/or fee/billing is based on the PO,
Agreement or other documents - copy of source document; or
If the product's quantity and/or fee/billing is estimated - ex-
planation on how the estimates were derived, i.e., assumptions
used, basis of assumptions and supporting documents/compu-
tations, if any;
1.5.4 If the quantity/cost of the consigned materials is based on the
invoice or other documents - copy of source document; or
If the quantity/cost of consigned materials isestimated - expla-
nation on how the estimates were derived, i.e., assumption used,
basis of assumptions and supporting documents/computations,
if any; and
1.5.5 Formula of Manufacture submitted to the Bureau of Customs.
2. BOI certificate of nonavailability;
3. Re-export bond equal to one-and-one-half times the ascertained duties,
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Table4 (continued)
4. Certificate-of Qualification (CQ)
4.1 Requirements for CQ
a) Authentic copy of importer's Certificate of Registration with the
SEC, and the copy of the Articles of Incorporation or Articles of
Go-Partnership, for corporations or partnerships; and Certificate
of Registration with the BTRCP (formerly BDT) for sole proprietor-
ships;
b) Financial Statement certified by the BIR;
c) Certified copy of a valid and subsistingcontract between the impor-
ter and foreign supplier/buyer;
d) Formula of Conversion certified by the Department of Science and
Technology or any appropriate government agency;
e) Plant's location map; and
f) Sworn Statement stating the following:
i. That the materials are to .be imported on consignment basis,
and are solely intended for commercial export or sample pur-
poses, based on the design/pattern prescribed by the supplier/
foreign buyer.
ii. Procedures to be followed in the production of imported
materials; and
iii. That the applicant does not havethe financial capacity to make
prior payment of the customs duties, taxes and other charges,
or does not have the necessaryresources to establish and ope_
rate a bonded manufacturing warehouse.
4.2 Procedures for Securing Certificate of Qualification (CQ)
a) The importer files five (5) copies of the Letter of Application and
the required documents with the Drawback Unit of the Bureau of
Customs if he is within the jurisdiction of the Port of Manila and
the NAIA Customs House. The documents are filedwith the District
Collector of Customs in caseof other ports of entry.
b) The Drawback Unit processesthe application and supporting docu-
ments. If found in order, the application istransmitted to the Legal
Unit for review.
c) The Legal Unit reviews the application and recommends approval/
disapproval of the CQ. The application is endorsed to the Com-
missioner of Customs for signature and approval.
d) The Commissioner of Customs approves/signsthe CQ.
e) Upon approval, the Certificate of Qualification (CQ) isprepared and
the applicant is required to signify acceptance of the terms and
conditions of the award, as indicated at the back of the CQ. (The
CQ shall be good for a period of six (6) months.)
I II. I I r I.I L
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Table 5
PROCEDURES FOR THE RELEASE OF IMPORTATION
UNDER CAO 3-78
f --
1. The importer submits to the Entry ProcessingDivision the following:
a) Import Entry and its supporting documents; and
b) Copy of the CQ.
2. The Entry Processing Division processesthe entry and stamps the name
"SMALL SCALE INDUSTRIES" and forwards the entry to the Special
Assessment Unit, Bonded Warehouse Division, Port of Manila (POM), or
International Airport (NAIA).
3. The Special Assessmentof Warehousing Unit:
a) Undertakes an examination and appraisal of the shipment pursuant
to existing rules and regulations;
b) Verifies if the imported materials as declared in the entry documents
are the onesspecified in the CQ;
c) Adds the quantity of raw materials imported to date and checks if the
quantity specified in the contract was not exceeded; and
d) Transmits entry tO the Bonds Division.
4. The Bonds Division, on the basisof the documents presented:
a) Checks if there are due and demandable bonds from previous impor-
tations;
b) Checksand approves ordinary re-export bonds; and
c) Transmits entry to the Cash Division, POM, or the Liquidation Unit,
Collection Division, NAIA.
5. The Cash Division or Liquidation Unit:
a) Receives entry and issues Permit to Deliver Imported Goods (POM)
or Gatepass (NAIA);
b) Forwards thesame to the Piers and Inspection Division, POM, or the
Office of the Bonded Warehouse Supervisor, or the PAL Warehouse,
NAIA; and
c) Returns the entry to the Special Assessment Unit, Bonded Warehouse
Division, POM, or the Warehousing Unit, Assessment Division, NAIA.
.... lr" .__
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to get a BOI certification of nonavailability of domestic substitute
for imported• raw materials. This condition is over and above the
more general restrictions on imports pending complete import
liberalization(Medalla 1990).
Another common feature of the variousduty exemption/draw-
back schemesis the "formula of manufacture" requirement. W8
(1987), on the other hand, notes that the determination of the
formula of manufactureappearsto be unsystematicand usually set
on an ad hoc basisin the Philippines.This is in stark contrast to
Rhee's (1984) assertion that the regular publication of up-to-date
input-output coefficients for exports is an important element in
effective import administration for exports in East Asiancountries.
Exemption/Drawback of Taxesand Duties on Imports
The capital equipment portion of adjustment (lb) and (lc) of
the analytical framework is made available to EPZA- and BOI-regis-
Table 6
REQUIREMENTS FOR BOC DRAWBACK CLAIMS
1. Import documents;
2. Export documents;
3. Bank credit memo or similar document evidencing remittance of export
•proceeds;
4. Abstract of record (Form No. 1);
5. Certificate of nonavailability of competitive substitutes for the imported
materials for regulated commodities under CB Circular 1029;
6, Formula of manufacture or conversion issued by DOST or other related
agencies;
7. Certificate of exportation (Form No. 11), if required; and or




d) Certificate of sales and delivery confirmed by a Chief of the Bonded
Warehouse Division (Drawback Form No. l-A); and/or
e) Cerficate of sales and delivery confirmed by EPZA (Drawback Form
No. 1-B).
Source: DTI (1988).216 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
Table 7
REQUIREMENTS AND PROCEDURES FOR FIXED DRAWBACK SCHEME
Documentary Requirements
1. Export invoice;
2. Bill of lading;
3. Bank credit memo; and
4. A statement under oath stating that:
a) Taxes and duties have been paid on the raw materials/supplies;
b) Said raw materials/supplies are not enjoying preferential rates; and
c) Said raw materials/supplies were purchased within one (1) year from
date of actual exportation.
Proceduresfor Availment of Standard Rebate
1. Importer/claimant files application including the required documents with
the Tax Rebate Center (TRC) through the Records Section of the BOI.
2. If the documents are complete, applicant pays the application fees with the
Cashier. Otherwise, documents are returned to the applicant for completion.
3. Tax Credit Application (TCA) is_forwarded to the industry group and eva-
luated by the Analyst.
4. The Analyst prepares an Evaluation Report and issuesa Tax Credit Certi-
ficate (TCC) amounting to the computed tax credit based on the standard
rate.
5. The deputized representative of the BOC and the BIR to the Center signthe
TCC's in the following manner:
a) The representative of the Customs Commissioner signsthe tax credits
against tariff duties.
b) "l-herepresentative of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue signs tax
credits against the value-added taxl
6. The TRC releasesthe TCC to the supplier/applicant within two (2) working
days from the time the application isofficially accepted.
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tered exporters. On the other •hand, the duty free importation
of intermediate inputsto export production, the other half of adjust-
ment (lb) and (lc), is met with varying degreesof effectivenessby
the different exemption and drawback systemsthat are currently in
place. This arisesbecausethe nonoCIF cost of imports under these
schemesis greater than zero as a •result of the transactionscost
associatedwith them. It should alsobe emphasizedthat in practice
all of these schemesaccount for lessthan 50 percent of export
vaues, with the majority of small exporters effectively excluded
(WB, 1987).
Table 8 presentsan estimate of the implicit tariff equivalentof
the direct and transactionscoststhat are incurredby firms who are
able to avail themselvesof the different duty exemption/drawback
•schemesthat are now in operation. The estimatesare basedon the
fixed fees required by the various exemption/drawback schemes
expressedasa proportion of averageimport valuesfor participating
exporters as gathered from interviews with a small number of
exporters. From the point of view of the individual exporter, Iocat-
tl_ in an EPZ distorts the price of imported inputs leastif one takes
into account both direct and indirect (transactions)costsof import-
ing materials.EPZ firms are charged fees that are almost nil when
expressedasa proportion of the value of their imports. Furthermore,
they aresubjectto the leastnumber of documentary and procedural
requirementsinsofar as their importation of intermediate inputs is
concerned. This is, however, achieved at great coststo the govern-
ment in terms of infrastructure and administrative expenses.Note
that, even if no allowancewere madefor the capital costsof putting
up the EPZs, the EPZA consistentlyremainsin deficit from its incep-
tion. The cumulative net lossof the EPZh, in the period 1985-89
amounted to _1.08 billion, it being in the red in four yearsout of
this five-year period.
While BMWs free exporters from actually paying taxes and
duties on imported inputs, the financial costs associatedwith this
system in the form of supervisionfees, overhead expense,and per-
formance/reexport bonds premiums are by no meanssmall when
expressedin nominal terms. In addition to the supervision fee of
_45,000 per annum, BMW operators have to shoulder the rental
cost of the facility. These expenseitemsappearto betoo lumpy for
small exporters and, thus, inhibit them from using this mechanism.
However,when expressedrelative to the value of the imports of the
typical BMW, these feesdo not appear to be as highbecauseof the
largenessof their operations. In fact, the evidence suggeststhat
BMWs are the secondmost effective mechanisi_in providing tariff218 JOURNALOFPHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
Table8
ESTIMATED IMPLICIT TARIFF EQUIVALENT OF TRANSACTIONS
COSTSASSOCIATED WITH VARIOUS IMPORT SCHEMESFOR











- service fee 1.00 4.00
- re-exportbond 0.00 1.40
- others 1.00 1.00
Total 2.00 6.40
CAO 3-78 low high
- re-exportbond 1.69 1.69
- others 3.50 6.00
Total 5.19 7.69
DrawbackScheme low high
- interestcost 3,75 15.00
- 99% limit 0.38 0.38
- unofficialcharges 1.88 0.00
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free inputs to export producers. Nevertheless,some improvements
in the administration of BMWsneedto be made.While the procedur-
al requirementsfor importations under BMWs aresimpler relativeto
other schemes,thesearemore stringentthan thosein other countries
where exporters using BMWsare not required to submit a "formula
of manufacture" and to posta reexportbond (Rhee 1984).
The operation of CCBWsisa commendabledevelopment since
it minimizes the biasagainstsmall exporters inherent in the BMW
system. Note that BMWs and CCBWsdo not differ very much in
terms of the implicit tariff embeddedin the costsof their imports.
Furthermore, some CCBWs have also introduced laudable innova-
tions of their own. For instance,Philexport allows the issuance of a
postdated check in lieu of the reexport bond. This haseffectively
permitted exporters to escape the payment of the reexport bond
premium and suggeststhat, in the future, a promissory note might
be able to take the place of the reexport and performance bond
requirementsof the other schemes.
The complicated administrative requirementsand the implied
high transactions cost of importing intermediate inputs for export
production under CAO 3-78 result in an implicit tariff equivalent
to 6 percent. While this figure is roughly one-half of that implied
by the BOC drawback scheme,it ismore than three times that under
the BMW scheme.The culprit behind the unfavorablecomparisonof
the exemption system under OAO 3-78 with the BMW system
appearsto be the more complex and time consumingimport proce-
dure under the former. Also, the higher reexport bond required
under CAO 3-78 adds four-tenths of one percent to the implicit
tariff equivalentof the variouscostsinvolved.
The duty drawback system under the BOCand the BOI, on the
other hand, entails additional cost in terms of the interest cost on
the working capital used to pay the duties and taxes on imported
intermediate inputs before the tax credit claimsareactually granted.
The capital holding cost constitutes by far the bulk of the implicit
tariff equivalent of the direct and indirect costsassociatedwith the
drawback mechanism. Exporters availing themselvesof the duW
drawback on intermediate inputs have to contend with the
tedious import arrangements, as well as with the time consuming
procedure attendant to the availment of the drawback claims. In
the caseof the BOC scheme,all these costsamount to at least one-
half of (and at most equal to) the averagetariff rateon raw material
inputs if there is no duty exemption/drawback. While the drawback
under the BOI system is generally made available within a shorter
period of time relative to that of the BOC, tl_e implicit tariff on220 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
imports subject to the BOI drawback isstill roughly equal to that of
the CAO 3-78 system and roughly equal to 6 percentor one-quarter
of the averagetariff rate on intermediate inputs in the absenceof a
duty exemption/drawback. Moreover, it should be pointed out that
the product coverageof the fixed drawback system of the BOI is
rather limited.
To sum up, there appearsto be an obviousneed to streamline
the existing import arrangements for exporters. This is a major
sourceof indirect cost of imports of intermediate inputs by export-
ers. With regard to the relative merits of the various exemption/
drawback schemes, the advantagesof the BMWs and CCBWs over
other schemescannot be underestimated. However, the former are
better suited to firms that produce primarily for export. At the
same time, the edge of exemption over the drawback scheme is
obvious. Thus, one cannot escapethe needfor an efficient exemp-
tion system that will cover firms that produce both for the domes-
tic and export markets as well as those that export marginally as
these types of exports will become increasinglyimportant in the
medium term. There is also a need to simplify the administrative
arrangementsof the individual drawback asit representsa big pro-
portion of the implicit tariff equivalent of the direct and indirect
costs of imports subject to individual drawback. The use of a
promissory note in lieu of the reexport and performance bonds
should alleviatesomewhat the increasedcostssuffered by exporters
due to their inability to import duty free inputs. The coverageof the
standard rebateshould be broadenedgiventhe proven advantageof
_ this system in reducing the implicit tariff on imports for use in
export production.
Rebate of implicit Tariff on Domestically-Produced
Tradeable Input
The zero rating of exports under VAT partially addressesthe
requisites of adjustment (lc) of our analytical framework as it re-
batesthe domestic.indirect tax component of the implicit tariff for
domestically-producedtraded inputs. However, the holding cost of
capital involved in the advancepayment of VAT on raw materials
is not taken into consideration. Moreover, the import duty portion
of the implicit tariff on domestically-sourcedimportable inputs is
not accountedfor. It is interestingto note that the tax credit equal
to 10 percent of the net local content that is given to exporters
under the old Investment Code (BP 391) provided, among other
compensating adjustments, part of the duty component of adjust-MANASAN: FISCAL INCENTIVES FOR EXPORTS 221
ment (lc). 4 Therefore, it isunfortunate that thisprovision was
dropped with the promulgation of the 1987 Investment Incentive
Code.
Treatment of Indirect Exporters
FinaJly, it should be pointed out that correction (ld) called
for by our analytical framework is available only to indirect
exporters registeredwith the BOI. In practice,the number of BOI-
registeredindirectexporters isverysmall.The inadequatemechanisms
availableaimed at giving indirect exporters accessto inputs at free
trade prices,aswell asthe failure to rebatethe tariff that would have
been paid on domestically-purchasedimportable intermediate in-
puts, have not only made our exporters lesscompetitive than their
foreign competitors but have also hampered the development of
(6_c_W_i--d-linkd_je_ from our exports. In this regard, the Philippines
Sh-(_l-dexploiter-for indirect exporters the South Koreandomestic
letter of credit. Although designed primarily to afford indirect
exporters automatic accessto export financing, the system canalso
be usedas a convenient and automatic meansof verifying transac-
tions between exporters and indirect exporters, thus giving the
government a mechanismfor providingtariff-free inputs to indirect
exporters (Rhee 1984).
3.2 Export Incentives under BOI and EPZA s
3.2.1 Description
Incentives to exports in the form of investment and other
inducements have been in force in the Philippinessince 1970 with
the enactment of RepublicAct 6135 or the Exports IncentivesAct.
Since then, it hasbeenamendedand codified three timesover. How-
ever, the changesintroduced under Betas Pambansa391 (BP 391)
in 1983 were truly radicalanddeservesomecomment despitethe fact
4. Note that since the early 1980s only 30 tariff lines have been subject to duty
of lessthan 10 percent. Moreover, the average tariff on intermediate inputs hassince stood
at 25 percent (Medalla 1986). Thus, the correction of the duties portion of (lc) even
with the tax credit on net local content was incomplete. Finally, it should be pointed
out that over and above rebating the part of the duties that would have been paid if the
locally-produced Inputs were imported, the tax credit for net local content provision
effectively grants registered exporters a subsidy equal to 10 percent of their value added.
This result becomes apparent once one decomposes net local content into its parts: local
nonindigenous raw materials plus value added.
5. In addition to the special treatment of imported materials and equipment in
EPZs that effectively establish a free trade regime for exports, EPZA grants the same incen-
tives to exporters asthOse offered by the BOI.222 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
that the law has since been superseded by Executive Order 226
(EO 226) or the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987 (OIC 1987).
A comparison of the incentives granted under BP 391 and
EO 226 is presentedin Table 9. EO 226 replacesthe provisionson
tax credit on net value earnedand net localcontent with an income
tax holiday. Duty free importation of capital equipment is made
availableto both exporting and nonexporting firms under EO 226
while this privilege was granted to exporting firms only under BP
391.6
EPZA-registeredfirms producesolelyfor the export market. On
the other hand, BOI registration may be obtained if the proposed
project is included in the Investment Priorities Planor, if it isnot so
listed, at least50 p_ent of its total production is for export.7 The
equity restrictionson foreign investorsarewaived if they proposeto
engagein a pioneer project or if they propose to export at least 70
percentof their total output.8
3.2.2 Assessment
Following the approach developed in Manasan (1986; 1988),
the impact on the internal rate of return (IRR) of a hypothetical
BOI-registered firm of the more important provisions of BP 391
and EO 226 is estimated. Under BP 391, the benefits to exporters,
measuredin termsof incrementsin their IRR, are three timesaslarge
asthose granted to nonexporters (Table 10). On the other hand, EO
226 does not differentiate between exporters and nonexporters.
Consequently, the inducements made available to exports are
reduced by half while those provided to nonexporters are almost
doubled as a result of the shift to the 1987 Investments Incentive
Code (Tables 10and 11).
From the vantagepoint of the analytical framework presented
in Section 2, the income tax holiday provided to new and expand-
ing EPZA/BOl-registered exporters under EO 226 and the tax credit
on net value earned and net local content granted to existing and
new exporters under BP 391 may be viewedasprovidingcompensat-
ing adjustmentsto counteract the antiexport bias resultingfrom the
overvaluationof the domestic currency arising from the prevailing
trade regime, adjustment (2). It was pointed out earlier that, in
6. BP 391 allowed pioneer nonexporting firms to defer all duties and taxes on
capital equipment while nonpioneer, nonexporting firms were permitted to defer only
50 percent of these taxes for a period of five years.
7. The 50 percent expor_ criterion was first introduced in 1983.
9, In general, foreign equity participation in any particular project cannot exceed
40 percent.Table 9




BP 391 EQ 226
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Incentive Domestic Export DomesZic Export
producer producar producer producer m
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1. Exemption from duties 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% :o
and taxes on imported
capital equipment
nn
2. Deferment of duties 100% 50% N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A _
and taxes on imported
capital equipment, to
be repaid within 5 years
3. Tax credit on domestic 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
capital equipment
equivalent to duties
and taxes on similar
foreign equipment
4. Tax credit on domestic 100% 100% N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
capital equipment to




5. Tax credit on net value 10% 5% 10% 5% NIA NtA NIA NIA
earned for five years




7. Tax holiday N/A N/A N/A N/A 6-8 yrs.a/ 4-7 yr_/ _ yrs.a/ 4-7 yrs.a/ z
8. Net operating Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No t- o
losscarry over "n
9. Deduction from No No No No Yesb/ Yesb/ Yesb/ Yesb/ _ _z
r-
taxable income of 50%
of incremental labor z






a/These are applicable to new projects. Expanding firms are entitled to 3-year tax holiday. Existing firms are not entitled -o
to the tax holiday at all. m
Z
b/Redundant for firms enjoying tax holiday. -4MANASAN : FISCALINCENTIV ESFOREXPORTS 225
Table10
CHANGE IN THE INTERNAL RAT,EOF RETURN OF HYPOTHETICAL BOI
REGISTERED FIRMS UNDER BP_191 a
(In percentage points)
Exporting Non-Exporting
Non-Pioneer Pioneer Non-Pioneer Pioneer
n=10 n=20 n=10 n=20 n=10 n=20 n=10 n=20




2. Tax Credit 2.25 .5 3.5 1.75 2.25 .5 3,5 1.75
on net
valueearned
3. Tax credit 9.0 4.75 9.0 4.75 ....
on net local
content
4. Total 15.75 6.75 17.0 10.0 3.75 1.75 5.5 3.25
a/Changein IRR iscomputedrelativeto IRRo = 10%
b/Computedbasedon tk = .2and VAT wheretk istariff on capitalequipment.
addition to effectively providing exporters with a rebate on the
tariff that would have been paid had locally procured importable
intermediate inputs been imported, the tax credit on net local
content of exports also grants an adjustment equal to 10 percent
of the value added in the export activity. This implies that, after
correcting for the implicit tariff embedded in the domestic price
of the domestically-purchased importable input, BP 391's provi-
sions on tax credit on net local content and on net value earned
give registered exporters, at the firm level, an adjustment whose
benefit is equal to 15 percent and 20 percent of the value added of
nonpioneer exporting firms and pioneer exporting firms, respective-
ly. Recalling that the required correction under (2) calls for augment-
ing the value added in the export activity by an amount equal to the
• oduct of the value added and the proportional difference in the226 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
Table 11
CHANGE IN THE INTERNAL RATE OF RETURN OF HYPOTHETICAL
BOI REGISTERED FIRMS UNDER EO 226 a
(In percentage points)
Non-Pioneer Pioneer
n=10 n=20 n=10 n=20
1. Tax holiday 2.5 1.75 3,5 2.5
without extension
2. Tax holiday 3.75 2.75 4.0 3.0
with maximum
extension
3. Duty exemption 3.5 2.5 3,5 2.5
on capitalb
4. 1 + 3 7,25 4.9 8.25 5.75
5. 2 + 3 8.75 6,0 9,0 6.5
a/Change in IRR iscomputed relative to IRRo = 10%.
b/Computed basedon tk = .2 and VAT where tk istariff on capital equipment.
shadow and official exchange rates and noting that the estimated
overvaluation of the exchange rate resulting from the protection
system is in the vicinity of 25 percent (Medalla 1986), we can
safely conclude that BP 391 incentives provide registeredexport-
ers with slightly lessthan the required adjustment to counteract
the overvaluation of the domestic currency. Furthermore, this
highlights Rhee's (1984) assertion that "a value-added based
incentive is the ideal form of tax incentive for exports." This is so
becausevalue added-basedincentivespermit an appropriate amount
of correction to bemade at the firm level.
A comparison of line 2 in Table 10 and line 1 in Table 11
suggeststhat the tax credit for net value earned under BP 391 and
the income tax holiday under EO 226 provide roughly equivalent
benefits to new and expanding exporters, This implies that the
income tax holiday provides new and expanding BOI/EPZA-regis-MANASAN: FISCAL INCENTIVES FOR EXPORTS 227
tered exporters, on the aggregate,with a compensatingadjustment
that is approximately equal to 5-10 percent of their value added.
However, it should be emphasizedthat under EO 226_x_orters are
not able to get the equivalent benefits arisingfrom the value added
portion of the ta_ credit on net local content that was available
under BP 391. )doreover, becausethe incometax holiday is profit-
basedthe correction arisingtherefrom tendsto holdat the aggregate
level but not at the firm level.Thus, some new and expandingBOI/
EZPA-registeredenterprisesmight actually receivemore or lessthan
the averagebenefit depending on the distribution of their income
stream over time. Furthermore, existing exporters are not entitled
to the incometax holiday under EO 226 although they are similar-
ly penalized by the protection system. Finally, the absenceof tax
sparing arrangements between the Philippines and major capital
exporting countriesthat tax their residents'incomeona global basis
nullifies the potential benefit to the foreign investorsof the income
tax holiday.
To sum up, the changesintroduced in the investmentsincentive
scheme under EO 226 have resulted in the increasedinadequacy
of BOI/EPZA incentives in providing export producers, at the
aggregate level, with the equivalent compensating adjustment to
counteract the antiexport bias arising from the overvaluation of
the domestic currency because of the protection system. What is
even more alarming is the failure of the system to provide the
appropriatecorrection at the firm level,unlike BP 391.
A number of other issuesthat have a direct bearingon export
promotion may be raised as regards the Investments Incentives
Code. First, the "measured capacity" concept as a criterion in
project selection was dispensedwith under BP 391 but was reinsti-
tuted under EO 226. This concept impliessome limitation on com-
petition: It losessubstancenot only when there is a potential for
exports but alsowhen imports are not prohibited. Thus, if the BOI
uses it to regulate entry it will penalize exporters on two counts:
potential exporters might not be allowed entry becauseof over-
crowding; and, existing exporters will haveto bearthe higher input
costsimplied by limited output (arisingfrom the useof the measured
capacityconcept) in the upstreamindustries.
Second, there has been some concern about the competitive-
nessof BOI incentiveswith those offered by other countries given
the importance of foreign investments in filling the country's
financing gap. Manasan (1988) assessed the investment incentives
granted by the ASEAN countriesand concludedthat the tax regimes
in the saidcountriesare, to a largeextent, equally attractive with or228 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
without investment incentives. Since that comparison was based on
EO 226 incentives, it may be inferred from the results of our earlier
discussion of the merits of a profit-based incentive that BP 391
incentives are more generous than those of other ASEAN countries
with respect to export producers. Also, the Philippines, unlike
Malaysia and Singapore, does not provide exporters with incentives
based on export promotion/overseas expansion expenditures. Thus,
the adoption of EO 226 might have reduced the ability of the
Philippines to attract footloose export industries relative to its
neighbors in the region.
Finally, what appears to hinder the flow of foreign capital into
the country is not so much the amount of incentives that are avail-
able but the restrictive regulatory environment for foreign invest-
_,_ments that exists at present. The replacement of the Investment -- i_ _ ,
_,r-JPriorities Plan with a short negative list of activities that would be
,._'_/" closed to foreigners would be a step in the right direction. A review
_J/ of the equity and divestment rules isalso called for.
4.0 CONCLUSION
When viewed against the backdrop of the total protection
structure, the rationale for fiscal incentives to exports becomes
apparent: to compensate for the bias against exports that arises
from the prevailing trade regime. Obviously, the first-best solution
to this problem is the outright revamp of the structure of protection
whereby a uniform tariff structure is put in place while nontariff
measuresare eliminated and th_ exchange rate is allowed to seekits
own level in a free market. However, in the event that the set of
policies defined by this first-best solution is not yet in place, it is
essential that a second-best policy package aimed at making our
exporters competitive with their foreign counterparts be put in
place. The second-best solution requires: (1) the provision of inter-
mediate inputs and capital equipment to exporters at free trade
prices, and (2) the provision of incentives designed to counteract
the penalty on exports that results from the existing structure of
protection at the firm level.
Access to intermediate inputs for exports at_d_distorted prices
is greatly hampered by (1) the existing government requirement for
exporters to get acertificate of nonavailability of domestic substitutes
for imported raw materials from the BOI; (2) the transactions costs
arising from the complicated import arrangements for exporters that
are currently in place; (3) the absenceof up-to-date and disaggregat-
ed input-output coefficients that should streamline and introduceMANASAN; FISCAL INCENTIVES FOR EXPORTS 229
greater automaticity and transparency in the administration of the
various exemption/drawback mechanisms; (4) the absenceof an
effective exemption/drawback system for small as well asmarginal
exporters; (5) the inadequacyof the existing mechanismto provide
indirect exporters with accessto intermediate and capital inputs at
free trade prices;and (6) the failure to rebatethe tariff that would
have been paid had domestically-sourced importable inputs to
exportsbeenimported.
Oh the other hand, the governmentappearsto havebacktracked
in respect to the provision of compensatory incentivesto exports
with the enactment of the 1987 Omnibus Investments Incentives
Code.. While the earlier legislation included a value added-based
incentiveaswell asone formulated to correct for the tariff embodied
in the domestic price of locally-manufactured importable inputs to
exports, the new incentive schemeeliminated these measuresand
effectively reduced the benefits granted to exports. Furthermore,
the income tax holiday under EO 226 has the undesirablecharac-
teristic of either overcompensatingor undercompensatingexporters
at the firm level,makingit an efficient userof government resources.,
The efficacy of usinga value added-basedincentivecannot be over-
emphasizedin this regard.It shouldbe recognizedthat, at this point,
it is not possibleto simply revert back to the 1983 incentivesscheme
becauseof the Philippine accessionto GATT. The newchallengelies
in the designof innovative performance-basedincentivesthat provide
the necessaryadjustmentsat the firm leveland do not invitecounter-
vailingmeasuresfrom the country's trading partnersl
Finally, it should be emphasizedthat the pitfalls in designing
compensatory policiesfor exports that provide the appropriate level
of correction at the firm level reinforce the urgent needto moveto
the first-bestsolution.230 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
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